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Explaining Aboriginal Treaty Negotiation
Outcomes in Canada: The Cases of the
Inuit and the Innu in Labrador
CHRISTOPHER ALCANTARA University of Toronto
Introduction
From 1921 to the early 1970s, the federal government refused to negoti-
ate any new land claims agreements with aboriginal peoples in Canada.
In 1973, in Calder, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed
the existence of aboriginal title. The Court ruled that aboriginal title was
not a creation of the Crown, but rather stemmed from aboriginal posses-
sion of ancestral lands from time immemorial ~Macklem, 2001: 268–
269!. Six months after Calder, the federal government invited aboriginal
groups who had not yet signed a treaty with the Crown to enter into nego-
tiations with them under a new federal comprehensive land claims pro-
cess ~RCAP, 1996: 533; Scholtz, 2006: 68–71!.
This process, which still exists today, is designed to replace undefined
aboriginal rights with a new set of specific treaty rights. To do so, aborig-
inal groups must prove to the federal and provincial governments that
their rights to their claimed lands have never been extinguished; that they
traditionally and currently occupy and use their lands largely to the exclu-
sion of other groups; and that they are a clearly identifiable and recog-
nizable aboriginal group ~INAC, 1998!. Once this is accomplished the
three parties negotiate a Framework Agreement, setting out the process,
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the issues and the timeline for negotiations. Once a Framework Agree-
ment is achieved, the parties negotiate a non-legally binding Agreement-
in-Principle ~AIP!, and then a Final Agreement. The Final Agreement
must be signed and ratified by all three parties.
In 1977, the Inuit and the Innu in Labrador each submitted state-
ments of intent to the federal and provincial governments to begin com-
prehensive land claims negotiations. On 22 January 2005, the Labrador
Inuit Association ~LIA! and the governments of Canada and Newfound-
land and Labrador concluded 28 years of negotiations by signing the
Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement. The Innu, however, are nowhere
near to completing their agreement. Although the Innu were able to com-
plete a Framework Agreement in 1996, an Agreement-in-Principle ~AIP!
remains elusive.
What explains this variation in comprehensive land claims ~CLC!
negotiation outcomes? The common explanation among politicians,
bureaucrats, negotiators and observers is that a large-scale economic devel-
opment project is a necessary condition to “get a deal.” This paper chal-
lenges this explanation by looking at two separate cases located in the
same province and virtually ignored by the literature: the Inuit and the
Innu in Labrador. To do so, this paper relies on primary and secondary
sources, including 28 interviews with Innu, Inuit, and federal and pro-
vincial politicians, negotiators, bureaucrats, lawyers, elders, advisors and
citizens from Nain, Makkovik, Natuashish, Sheshatshiu, North West River,
Happy Valley-Goose Bay, St. John’s, Cornerbrook and Ottawa.1 The main
findings of this paper are that a set of internal and external factors rela-
tive to the First Nation provides a better explanation for: ~a! whether a
CLC negotiation outcome is obtained; and ~b! at what speed an outcome
is obtained.
Setting the Stage: Preferences and Incentives
Politics is mainly about rival actors competing for scarce resources ~Hall
and Taylor, 1996: 937!. These actors have preferences that structure their
relationships with other actors. If the preferences of negotiating actors
are similar, then an agreement may be easier to achieve. If actors have
different preferences, then an agreement may be more difficult to achieve.
Federal policy states that the federal government is interested in ensur-
ing certainty and finality for the purposes of economic development, and
in fostering aboriginal capacity for governance and self-sufficiency ~INAC,
1998: 5!. However, a number of Inuit, Innu and federal officials have
argued that the federal government’s main goal is to foster and encour-
age large-scale economic development projects, usually to reap the rev-
enues generated from them. Government actions to facilitate economic
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development have not always respected aboriginal concerns or interests
~Angus, 1992: 68–69; Miller, 2000: 365–366; Nuke, 2006; Penikett, 2006!.
Newfoundland and Labrador’s goals are similar to federal goals.
Although there is no official provincial land claims policy, statements
made by provincial actors indicate that the province is mainly interested
in economic development. According to Minister Ernest McLean ~2001!,
“successful land claims negotiations with the LIA and the Innu will ensure
economic, legal and social certainty for governance and business and
social development.” Settling these claims is necessary because Labra-
dor is the key to the economic health of the entire province ~Rideout,
2004!. Moreover, economic development should benefit all provincial cit-
izens and should not necessarily be at the expense of aboriginal peoples
in the province ~Pelley, 2006; Lush, 2001; Executive Council, 1997!.
Yet the actions of the provincial government bring into question
whether the province believes economic development should benefit both
aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples. During the 1970s to the 1990s,
the provincial government engaged in commercial logging, the develop-
ment of hydroelectric projects, fishing, low-level flying, and mining in
Labrador, all without consulting the Innu or the Inuit ~Nuke, 2006; Rich,
2006; Tony Andersen, 2006!. According to members of both aboriginal
groups, the proportion of revenue that governments and businesses have
derived from these projects dwarfs the amount that the aboriginal groups
have received ~John-Pierre Ashini 2006; Nuke 2006; Ben Andrew 2006;
Riche 2006; Tony Andersen 2006; Jararuse 2006!.
In terms of the Innu and the Inuit, they both want to maximize their
control over their traditional lands to protect their traditional ways of life
Abstract. In 1977, the Inuit and the Innu in Labrador each submitted statements of intent to
begin treaty negotiations with the federal and provincial governments under the federal com-
prehensive land claims process. On 22 January 2005, the Inuit, the federal government, and the
province of Newfoundland and Labrador signed the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement.
The Innu, on the other hand, are nowhere near to completing their agreement. This paper seeks
to explain why the Inuit were able to complete their agreement, whereas the Innu were not. It
challenges the conventional explanation that an economic development project is a necessary
condition for completing a treaty by arguing that a number of internal and external factors need
to be taken into account.
Résumé. En 1977, les Inuits ainsi que les Innus du Labrador ont respectivement annoncé leur
intention de lancer des négociations en vue de conclure un traité avec les gouvernements fédéral
et provincial en vertu du processus des recendications territoriales globales. Le 22 janvier 2005,
les Inuits, le gouvernement fédéral et la province de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador ont conclu l’Accord
sur les revendications territoriales des Inuit du Labrador. Les Innus, de leur côté, sont encore
loin d’une entente. Cet article cherche à expliquer pourquoi les Inuits ont pu signer un accord
alors que les Innus n’y sont pas parvenus. L’article remet en question l’explication souvent
avancée voulant qu’un projet de développement économique soit une condition nécessaire à
l’achèvement d’une entente et soutient plutôt qu’un ensemble de facteurs intérieurs et extérieurs
doivent être pris en compte.
and practices, to protect their interests in and derive revenues and jobs
from economic development, and to take control over their lives in areas
such as education, health, law enforcement, environmental protection,
culture, heritage, fishing and hunting ~Samson et al., 1999: 30–34; Wad-
den, 1991: 200; Jack, 1990: 23; Andrew, 2006; Nuke, 2006!. There are
some differences between the goals of the Innu and the Inuit. The most
important difference is the way in which each group views their posi-
tion relative to Canada. The Innu originally came to the table with the
notion that any agreement had to recognize Innu sovereignty ~Andrew,
2006; Innes, 2006; Wadden, 1991: 200; Innu Nation, 1995: 175; Pelley,
2006!. Their desire for sovereignty has softened over time, but there are
still some Innu leaders who continue to hold sovereignty as the end goal
for their comprehensive land claim. Contrast this to the Inuit, who have
rarely, if ever, invoked the language of sovereignty. They have always
preferred to negotiate an agreement that safeguards their traditional ways
of life and interests in economic development, and that allows them to
take control over important policy areas through some form of self-
government within the federation. The language and strategies used by
Inuit leaders ~LIA presidents, vice presidents, board members, negotia-
tors and elders! have always been based on conciliation, compromise
and accommodation ~Tony Andersen, 2006; Barbour, 2006; Hibbs, 2006;
Pain, 2006; Haysom, 2006; Rowell, 2006; Toby Andersen, 2001; Ander-
sen III, 1990!.
In addition to preferences, actors are subject to incentives regarding
whether or not to work towards completing an agreement. These incen-
tives, according to Douglass C. North ~1990: 3!, are shaped by the insti-
tutional framework that actors operate within. The institutional framework
structures each actor’s incentives to engage in exchange and trade by deter-
mining the costs and benefits of cooperation versus non-cooperation. Ideas
such as rights also have a role in structuring incentives, but in the case
of treaty negotiations, they tend to be pushed into the background by
more practical considerations ~McCormick, 1997!.
During comprehensive land claims ~CLC! negotiations, the federal
and provincial governments have few incentives to complete an agree-
ment. The CLC process and its formal rules and procedures place aborig-
inal groups in a weaker position relative to the federal and provincial
governments. The burden of proof is on the aboriginal groups, who must
adopt Western standards of knowledge, proof, discourse and dialogue if
they want negotiations to proceed ~Samson, 2003; Michel, 2006; Andrew,
2006; John-Pierre Ashini, 2006!. Aboriginal groups have little power to
influence the agenda, as they can only negotiate those responsibilities
and jurisdictions that are listed under the federal CLC policy ~INAC, 1998:
7–8!. Moreover, the government can at any time declare that certain lands
are no longer on the table for discussion.
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Government dominance of the CLC process is enhanced by the Con-
stitution Act of 1982, which gives both levels of government a wide range
of powers over the land, water bodies and peoples in Labrador. Both gov-
ernments have frequently exercised these powers without consulting
aboriginal peoples ~Nui, 2006; Rich, 2006; Andersen III, 2006; Tony
Andersen, 2006; Andrew, 2006; Napes Ashini, 1992: 124; Marshall, 2006!.
For instance, according to Wadden ~1991: 45!, “Canadian governments
have always acted as though the Innu, and their land rights in Nitassinan,
do not exist. Mines, hydroelectric projects and pulp and paper mills have
sprouted up all over the Innu homeland during this century, enriching
the coffers of provincial governments and multinational companies but
wrecking havoc with Innu lives.”
Government incentive structures are also affected by the negotia-
tion stakes. In Newfoundland and Labrador, the key negotiation stakes
are held by the province, resulting in most of the negotiations occurring
between the aboriginal group and the province ~INAC, 1998: 6–7; Hawco,
2006; Rowell, 2006!. The federal government, for instance, has an in-
terest in cash transfers, taxation, implementation costs, fisheries,
migratory birds and environmental protection. The province, on the
other hand, has jurisdiction over inland water, economic develop-
ment, renewable and non-renewable resources, land, environmental
protection and local governance ~Pelley, 2006; Carter, 2006; Haysom,
2006!. The fact that the province controls the key negotiation stakes is
important because provinces are usually reluctant negotiators who
“jealously guard their power” over land and resource management,
favouring established economic interests over aboriginal ones ~Scholtz,
2006: 8!.
Canadian courts, on the other hand, have provided governments with
mixed incentives. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia ~1997!, for instance,
the Court ruled that constitutionally protected aboriginal rights can be
infringed upon for the greater good of economic development. However,
the ability to engage in economic development is not unfettered, since
the Crown is still bound by its fiduciary duty to aboriginal peoples ~Mack-
lem, 2001: 252–253!. This also applies to provincial governments, who
have a duty to consult and accommodate those First Nations affected by
proposed economic development ~Penikett, 2006: 140–141!.
Other incentives to negotiate come from a growing awareness of
aboriginal rights and justice. For instance, former Deputy Minister of
INAC Scott Serson ~2006! mentioned that some bureaucrats and nego-
tiators felt pressure to get a deal done after the publication of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples ~RCAP, 1996! and the federal
government’s response, Gathering Strength.2 They felt they had to dem-
onstrate that Gathering Strength could successfully accommodate the con-
cerns raised in RCAP.
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In contrast to the mixed incentive structures facing governments, the
Innu and the Inuit face powerful incentives to work towards a final agree-
ment. First and most importantly, they have no better options to ade-
quately satisfy their preferences within the current institutional framework.
Members from both aboriginal groups have mentioned that the CLC pro-
cess is the “only game in town” for achieving the type of control they
want over their land ~Rich, 2006; Riche, 2006; Jararuse, 2006; Hibbs,
2006; Andersen III, 2006!. Aboriginal groups in Labrador and through-
out Canada have considered and used litigation, but judicial outcomes
are unpredictable and can be as damaging as helpful ~Macklem and Town-
shend, 1992: 78–79; Penikett, 2006!. Others have used protesting, but
this option, at least in the Innu case described below, does not in the end
let aboriginal groups gain the type of comprehensive control they want
over their land.
Both groups also face another incentive to negotiate, mainly that
“once it became clear that development was going to happen even in the
absence of a settlement, pressure began to grow at the community level
to resolve claims and to ‘catch a ride’ on the development that was occur-
ring” ~Angus, 1992: 71!. Both the Inuit and the Innu realize that govern-
ments will engage in economic development anyway, so coming to an
agreement is necessary to ensure they have a voice in how governments
and businesses undertake those developments ~Rich, 2006; Jararuse, 2006!.
In summary, the institutional framework governing comprehensive
land claims negotiations in Canada gives the federal and provincial gov-
ernments a significant advantage over participating First Nations. All three
negotiating parties face incentive structures that pressure them to nego-
tiate, but the federal and provincial governments are also subject to
stronger incentives that make them want to delay negotiations as much
as possible. In the context of these preferences and incentives, compre-
hensive land claims ~CLC! negotiations can take two roads. The first is
the long road where aboriginal groups negotiate with governments accord-
ing to the pace set by governments. On this road, negotiations tend to be
slow and laborious. The second path is the shorter road, when a factor or
convergence of factors creates an “opportunity window.” This is a moment
in time when reluctant government actors are most vulnerable to being
convinced to speed up their efforts to complete an agreement. The most
common factors triggering an opportunity window in CLC negotiations
tend to be large-scale economic development projects, a change in federal0
provincial leadership, or an influential court case.
Opportunity windows by themselves, however, do not automatically
lead to a completed treaty. A window is merely an opportunity for an
aboriginal group to push negotiations forward. The group still needs to
find a way to take advantage of a window. Also, the emergence of a
window is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for completing a
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treaty; a group can still complete a treaty without a window, but it may
take longer. The rest of this paper looks at the experiences of the Innu
and the Inuit in Labrador to determine the factors that best explain vari-
ation in comprehensive land claims negotiation outcomes.
The Innu and the Inuit: Two Divergent Paths
The Inuit: 1977–1996
In 1977, the Labrador Inuit Association ~LIA!, on behalf of the Labrador
Inuit, submitted their claim, Our Footprints Are Everywhere. The federal
government accepted the claim, praising it “as a model for other claim
submissions by native peoples in Canada” ~DIAND, 1990!. The prov-
ince, however, initially balked at the claim until 1980, when Premier Peck-
ford decided to accept the Inuit claim for negotiations subject to two
preconditions: negotiations had to lead to extinguishment, and the fed-
eral and provincial governments had to come to an agreement about cost-
sharing ~Borlase, 1993: 310!. These pre-conditions were problematic at
first but would later be temporarily set aside to facilitate negotiations.
Despite keen interest from the LIA, no active negotiations occurred
until 1989. This was because the federal government had a policy of only
engaging in active negotiations with up to six claimant groups at one
time ~Rowell, 2006; Haysom, 2006!. In 1984, a spot opened up for the
Labrador Inuit. Labrador Inuit negotiations that should have started in
mid-1985, however, were delayed until January 1989, because the fed-
eral and the provincial governments became entangled in policy and
program reviews. Once these reviews were finished, Framework Agree-
ment negotiations began in January 1989 and were completed by March
1990 ~Haysom, 2006!. Agreement-in-Principle ~AIP! negotiations, how-
ever, were much slower, especially during the first six years ~1990–
1996!. By spring of 1996, six years of negotiations had generated one
initialled chapter ~eligibility and enrollment!, and some progress on other
matters ~Pain, 2006; Carter, 2006!.
The Innu: 1977–1996
In 1977, the Naskapi Montagnais Innu Association, on behalf of the Innu
in Sheshatshiu and Davis Inlet, submitted their statement of claim to the
federal and provincial governments. The federal government initially
rejected the claim on the basis that the Innu land use and occupancy study
was incomplete. It would not be until 1991 that the Innu would submit a
study that was acceptable to the federal government. In the meantime,
the Innu focused on protesting, litigating and seeking international sup-
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port against the federal and provincial governments ~Innes, 2006; Innu
Nation, 1995, 1998!. They were also struggling with a wide range of
social and economic problems that would prevent them from success-
fully submitting a claim ~Backhouse and McRae, 2002!.
During the 1990s the Innu continued to protest and lobby against
low-level flying, but leaders in Sheshatshiu were becoming more inter-
ested in negotiating because of the mixed results of protesting. In 1991,
the Innu decided on the basis of community consultations to begin nego-
tiations with the federal government under the CLC process. Negotia-
tions were slow because of persisting and increasing internal distress ~i.e.,
alcoholism, drug abuse, Third World living conditions!, all of which were
highlighted by suddenly interested media. As a result, Innu leaders focused
mainly on solving these problems, as well as struggling with the federal
and provincial governments over policing, the judicial system, relocation
to Natuashish, logging, mining and other economic development activi-
ties ~Wadden, 1991; Innu Nation, 1995, 1998!. Political turmoil also hin-
dered Innu negotiations, as leadership was constantly changing and rival
factions with radically different views about negotiations began to emerge
along family lines. However, the Innu were able to negotiate a Frame-
work Agreement in 1996, mainly because they had elected a set of lead-
ers who were committed to negotiations.3
Voisey’s Bay and a New Premier: An Opportunity Window Opens
The pace of negotiations changed for both groups as a result of two events.
The first event occurred in 1994, when a $4.3 billion nickel deposit was
discovered in Voisey’s Bay, a region that both the Innu and the Inuit had
previously claimed. The discovery created a huge mineral rush in Labra-
dor and both governments were keen on accelerating land claims nego-
tiations to clear the way for mineral exploration and the Voisey’s Bay
development ~Innes, 2006; Haysom, 2006; Shafto, 2006!. This was espe-
cially true of the province, which saw the discovery as a crucial oppor-
tunity to increase its economic wealth.
The second factor triggering the opening of an opportunity window
was the election of Brian Tobin in January 1996. Tobin brought his federal-
level experience to the provincial table and made settling the claims a
priority for his government. He set out clear provincial parameters for
each of the items under negotiation, ratified them in cabinet, and autho-
rized provincial negotiators to get a deal done using those parameters
~Marshall, 2006!. The election of Brian Tobin was a real opportunity to
make significant progress towards an Agreement-in-Principle ~Haysom,
2006; Hawco, 2006; Marshall, 2006; Barbour, 2006; Chesley Andersen,
2006; Warren, 2006!.
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By spring of 1996, Inuit negotiations had stalled and become strained.
A number of critical issues, such as land quantum, resource-revenue shar-
ing and self-government, remained unresolved. The Inuit had become frus-
trated with the federal negotiator and had for a number of years asked
the federal government to bring in an external negotiator to represent the
federal government. Negotiations had also become more difficult and con-
flictual because of the discovery of Voisey’s Bay. Once nickel was dis-
covered in Voisey’s Bay, the provincial government immediately excluded
the area from negotiations. Ignoring Inuit objections, the province quickly
approved Inco’s application to begin building roads, an airport, a dock
and a campsite in the area. In response, the Innu and the Inuit conducted
joint protesting campaigns and applied for, and eventually received, on
appeal, a court injunction to stop development. The result was stalled
negotiations and an atmosphere of confrontation and mistrust.
Despite its initial slowdown effect on Inuit negotiations, Voisey’s Bay
was also an opportunity for the Inuit to speed up negotiations. In July 1996,
the federal and provincial governments and the Inuit agreed to fast-track
negotiations. The federal government also finally agreed to appoint an
external negotiator, Jim Mackenzie, a law professor from Carleton Uni-
versity, as chief federal negotiator. Although the parties made substantial
progress on a number of issues, a set of critical issues continued to hinder
negotiations. In the fall of 1997, the parties agreed to hold a three-day
senior officials’ meeting in Ottawa to resolve these issues. On the federal
side, INAC Deputy Minister Scott Serson was brought in to sit beside Jim
Mackenzie. On the provincial side, Premier Brian Tobin, who stayed in
Ottawa for the duration of the meetings, appointed Harold Marshall, a
senior provincial civil servant, and Bill Rowat, a former federal civil ser-
vant, to sit beside the provincial negotiators, with a mandate to resolve
the critical issues. Finally, the Inuit negotiators had the LIA president, vice
president and board members on call by phone to make immediate deci-
sions. The three days stretched into eleven and on 28 October 1997, the
three parties signed a three-page agreement resolving the major issues that
had held up negotiations ~land quantum, resource revenue sharing, Inuit
participation in development, financial compensation, self-government,
cost-sharing, and the national park and settlement areas!. From there, nego-
tiations moved quickly to an initialedAIP in 1999, and ratification in 2001.
With a completed AIP in hand, Final Agreement negotiations pro-
gressed relatively quickly but not without some significant problems. For
example, one difficult issue was land selection, the process governing
how the parties decide which pieces of land are to be included in the
land claims agreement. The Inuit were asked to provide a preliminary
land selection proposal and present it to the governments for their con-
sideration. The province’s reaction to the Inuit’s proposal was quite neg-
ative; in 1994, the province had offered seven small rectangular blocks
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of land to the Inuit. The Inuit’s proposal, however, contained a series of
large “ribbons” along water ways and along much of the coastline of
Labrador. In the end, the Inuit ended up accepting some land that they
were not really interested in, and giving up some land that they origi-
nally wanted. The province compromised by accepting the Inuit “ribbon”
concept and giving up more of the coastline then they originally intended.
A Final Agreement was eventually reached in 2004 and ratified in 2005.
The Innu, on the other hand, were unable to capitalize on the Voi-
sey’s Bay discovery or on the election of Brian Tobin. Although the Innu
did negotiate a Framework Agreement in 1996 and entered into fast-
tracked negotiations in 1997, very little progress on the AIP occurred. In
1999, the federal and provincial governments eventually withdrew from
the Innu negotiating table due to unreasonable Innu demands. When nego-
tiations resumed in 2001, they were no longer fast-tracked ~Backhouse
and McRae, 2002!. Rather, negotiations reverted to a pace of three to
five times a month. Progress remains slow and a number of critical issues
continue to paralyze negotiations ~Riche, 2006; Nui, 2006!.
Economic Development: A Necessary Condition?
Would the Inuit have completed their treaty if Voisey’s Bay had not been
discovered? The evidence above suggests yes, although the timeline for
completion would have been much longer than January 2005. Innu nego-
tiations, on the other hand, have shown little promise for completion
before, during, or after Voisey’s Bay. Since the Innu began comprehen-
sive land claims ~CLC! negotiations in 1977, there has been little to indi-
cate that a treaty was ever forthcoming.
This paper proposes a more comprehensive and nuanced framework
for explaining CLC negotiation outcomes in Canada. As illustrated in
Table 1, explanatory factors for CLC outcomes can be divided into four
quadrants. These quadrants are: internal and external factors that affect
whether an outcome is obtained ~quadrants 1 and 2! and internal and
external factors that affect the speed at which an outcome is obtained
~quadrants 3 and 4!. The factors listed in the four quadrants below deter-
mine outcomes and speeds on both the long ~i.e., the CLC process under
normal conditions! and the short ~i.e., opportunity windows! roads of
CLC negotiations.
Quadrant 1: Internal Factors Affecting Outcomes
Congruent Goals
Congruent goals have a powerful effect on whether a treaty is com-
pleted. By congruent goals, I mean the matching of government and First
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Nation goals with respect to the purposes of a Final Agreement. Congru-
ent goals were clearly present in the Labrador Inuit negotiations. For exam-
ple, during Final Agreement negotiations over the certainty and finality
provisions, the federal government preferred to use its usual cede, release
and surrender provision, negotiate a new alternative, or use a provision
found in another agreement in Canada. The LIA, on the other hand, was
unwilling to accept any provision that included “surrender,” but it was
willing to adopt the certainty provision in either the Dogrib or the Nisga’a
agreements. The province, on the other hand, insisted on cede, release
and surrender. Despite these differences, the parties were able to come
to an agreement. The shared goal among the parties was to avoid future
conflict, protests and litigation by creating certainty in land management
and development in the areas that the Inuit had claimed. In the end, the
agreed-upon certainty provision satisfied all three parties. The Inuit were
able to keep their aboriginal rights in their Inuit Lands ~their core lands!,
subject to the terms of the agreement. In exchange, they ceded and
released ~but did not surrender! their aboriginal rights to Inuit Settle-
ment Lands ~lands to which all three parties have extensive shared juris-
diction! and all lands previously claimed by the Inuit that were not
included in the treaty. According to all three parties, the result was a
certainty formula that cleared the way for economic development, while
satisfying the concerns of all three parties.
Contrast these experiences with the Innu. The Innu originally came
to the table with the notion that any agreement had to recognize Innu
sovereignty over their traditional lands; both the federal and the provin-
cial governments, however, have refused to recognize Innu sovereignty
~Andrew, 2006; Innes, 2006; Wadden, 1991: 200; Innu Nation, 1995: 175;
Pelley, 2006!. By the early 1990s, the Innu’s use of the term “Innu sov-
ereignty” during negotiations occurred much less frequently, culminat-
ing in a completed Framework Agreement in 1996.
TABLE 1
Matrix of Explanatory Factors for CLC Negotiation Outcomes4
Factors affecting
whether an outcome
is obtained
Factors affecting
the speed at which an
outcome is obtained
Internal factors Quadrant 1
— Congruency of goals
— Choice of tactics
— Internal cohesion
Quadrant 3
— Trust relationships
— Tactical timing
External factors Quadrant 2
— Government perceptions
Quadrant 4
— Governmental and external negotiators
— Land value and location
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Although the use of the concept of “Innu sovereignty” has basically
disappeared from the negotiation table, it remains a powerful force among
some Innu leaders and community members. For instance, one commu-
nity member has said, “The Innu should have total control on Innu
Lands—no sharing of control with government” ~Innu Nation, 1998: 44!.
A former Davis Inlet chief has remarked, “The Innu government should
have full power in Innu lands” ~Innu Nation, 1998: 44!. Another member
has said, “On the core lands, how are we going to manage the land if the
government can still overturn Innu Government decisions?” ~Innu Nation,
1998: 45!. The persistence of Innu sovereignty at the community level
has hindered the ability of negotiators to complete an Agreement-in-
Principle. This is because Innu negotiators must continually undertake
extensive public consultations with Innu community members before any
agreement can be signed. As a result, negotiators are constantly torn
between satisfying federal and provincial demands that an agreement not
recognize Innu sovereignty, and satisfying community demands for rec-
ognition and protection of Innu sovereignty.
Tactics
In general, governments are more interested in negotiations because the
costs ~money, reputation and political capital! of the alternatives ~i.e.,
litigation, protests and international lobbying! are perceived as being much
higher. As such, governments are more likely to work towards an agree-
ment with those First Nations that show a commitment to negotiations.
Conversely, governments are less likely to work towards a Final Agree-
ment with those First Nations that are confrontational.
Since 1977, the Inuit have consistently used a strategy of compro-
mise and negotiation. The strategies of protest, litigation, media and court-
ing recognition from international legal and political bodies were rarely
considered or used by LIA presidents, vice presidents or board members
~Barbour, 2006; Andersen III, 2006; Tony Andersen, 2006; Pain, 2006;
Hibbs, 2006!. All of the LIA politicians, board members, citizens and
negotiators whom I interviewed indicated that leaders, negotiators and
even community members were consistent over time in their desire for
an agreement through negotiations as opposed to other tactics. Govern-
ment actors recognized the Inuit’s commitment to negotiating and were
willing to work with the Inuit towards a completed treaty, even during
difficult times or through difficult issues.
Contrast this with the Innu, who have tended to favour protesting,
media campaigns, litigation and courting recognition from international
bodies. In the words of the Innu Nation’s Davis Inlet Inquiry Commis-
sion, “Protests are a good way to get our voices heard. We need to use
strong tactics, vocal speaking out @sic# against unwanted developments
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and in support of our rights.... We need to do this to get their @white
people# support to help us fight governments. If other people understand
our position, it will be good. We also need to lobby foreign governments
on our human rights” ~Innu Nation, 1995: 179!. For much of their involve-
ment in the CLC process, the Innu have engaged in confrontational strat-
egies rather than negotiating. They have fought the federal and provincial
governments over hunting regulations, military flights over their land,
poor administration of police and judicial services, and a lack of resources
to combat domestic ills, unemployment and poor housing. Since 2001,
however, negotiations have become the main tactic of choice for the Innu;
nonetheless, negotiations have moved very slowly, with little indication
that an Agreement-in-Principle or a Final Agreement is ever forthcoming.
Cohesion
Another variable affecting whether a CLC outcome is obtained is the
cohesiveness of the aboriginal community ~Whittington, 2005; Shafto,
2006; Serson, 2006; Warren, 2006; Backhouse and McRae, 2002: 42,
50!. In general, the Innu are a people beset with divisive leadership, inter-
nal division and strife. According to a Sheshatshiu elder, “I think a lot of
good things could come out from the agreement if only all the Innu
worked cooperatively, that is, if Innu do not fight with each other. That
is the biggest headache in this community today, because a lot of people
hate each other. They just don’t get along” ~Innu Nation, 1998: 23!. An
Innu Nation community consultation report states, “Some people com-
plain that the Band Council and the Innu Nation only help some people,
like their relatives, and not others. They don’t see some people as their
responsibility, even if they really need help.... They @Innu respondents#
say our leaders are money-chasing and become blindfolded by the dollar
sign” ~Innu Nation, 1995: 171!.
Moreover, since the 1950s, the Innu have suffered from severe social
and economic problems. In the words of a Davis Inlet elder, “There are
too many suicides, too much gas sniffing and overdosing, too much van-
dalism, too many people in jail. Young people especially are ruined” ~Innu
Nation, 1998: 21!. Between 1965 and February 1992, for example, 47
out of 66 deaths were alcohol-related; 23 of those deaths involved peo-
ple under the age of 20, and 32 were under the age of 40. From 1989 to
February 1992, there were 17 alcohol related deaths. From February 1991
to February 1992, 90 per cent of provincial court cases were a result of
alcohol abuse. Finally, in terms of children, there were 43 cases of sol-
vent abuse in 1990 and 66 cases in 1991 ~Innu Nation, 1995: 187!.
The point here is that domestic problems have overtaken any sus-
tained community interest or effort to negotiate a CLC agreement. Indeed,
the Innu have been divided since 1977 on whether they should negotiate
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a CLC agreement at all. Some leaders and community members believe
that negotiations are moving too fast and that there should be more of a
focus on solutions to community problems. Others see a CLC as a solu-
tion to these problems.
Contrast this to the Inuit, who have not had the same divisions or
domestic problems that the Innu have had. Federal and provincial inter-
viewees have identified the Inuit’s clear and consistent leadership, strong
capacity and relatively few internal problems as key factors for their com-
pleted agreement. Community support and cohesion have also been strong.
All of the Inuit people I interviewed mentioned that the communities
have always supported negotiations throughout the entire process. Inuit
negotiators were able to come to the table with the knowledge that they
had the support of the people. They were not distracted by severe com-
munity divisions or severe economic and social problems. Having a cohe-
sive community allowed the Inuit to negotiate in confidence and with
their full attention and resources. Community cohesion is important
because a negotiated Agreement-in-Principle and Final Agreement must
be ratified by the entire population of each aboriginal community through
a referendum. Without community cohesion and support for the nego-
tiating team, ratification of any initialled agreement becomes almost
impossible.
Quadrant 2: External Factors Affecting Outcomes
Government Perceptions
Another factor affecting whether a CLC outcome is obtained is govern-
ment perceptions of the aboriginal group. As Peter Russell has noted,
governments are not only primarily interested in facilitating economic
development, they also have a secondary interest in avoiding international
and domestic embarrassment. Governments are aware of the negative pub-
licity that can occur if they devolve powers to a group that is not ready
to take on the responsibilities. In light of this, government perceptions
determine the willingness of governments to devolve land management
and self-government responsibilities to the aboriginal group, both on the
long and short roads of negotiations. Three types of perceptions matter:
financial accountability, capacity for negotiations and self-government
and acculturation. If an aboriginal group is perceived poorly on these
indicators, then it is unlikely that an agreement will get completed in
either the long- or short-road scenarios.
Governments are keen on negotiating agreements with those First
Nations that have a demonstrated record of financial accountability and
capacity for negotiations and self-government. The Inuit were able to dem-
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onstrate both of these attributes. LIA negotiators came to the table pre-
pared and skilled at negotiating with government officials according to
the terms and the procedures of the CLC process ~Marshall, 2006; Hay-
som, 2006; Rowell, 2006; Shafto, 2006; Warren, 2006!. They also brought
to the table a record of financial accountability and capacity for govern-
ing themselves ~Shafto, 2006; Andersen III, 2006; Marshall, 2006; Bar-
bour, 2006!. According to former LIA President William Barbour, for
instance, during a visit to Nain in the late 1990s, government officials
remarked to him that the LIA “have the cleanest books in all of Atlantic
Canada” ~Barbour, 2006!. Others have admired the LIA’s administration
of post-secondary support programmes and non-insured health services
~Andersen III, 2006; Tony Andersen, 2006; Barbour, 2006!.
Contrast these positive perceptions with the negative ones that the
governments have regarding the Innu. A number of interviewees have
characterized government perceptions of the Innu as paternalistic ~Michel,
2006; Andrew, 2006!. The media and the federal government have all
observed the difficulties that the Innu have had in managing their fiscal
affairs ~CBC, 2005; Nui, 2006; Backhouse and McRae, 2002; Shafto,
2006!. At the First Ministers Constitutional Conference on Aboriginal
Rights in March 1987, Premier Brian Peckford told Innu participants:
“I’m not sure you’re being as smart as you think you’re being” ~quoted
in Wadden, 1991: 117!. In a meeting with then Minister of Indian Affairs
Pierre Cadieux, Peter Penashue remarked, “Could you get the mandate
to treat us like adults? ... We have to find a way for the Canadian gov-
ernment to treat us like adults” ~quoted in Wadden, 1991: 166!. Accord-
ing to Backhouse and McRae ~2002: 50!,
it is not clear that the federal or provincial governments see self-government
for the Innu in the foreseeable future. There is a strong sense among some
officials that the Innu do not have the capacity to engage in self-government
or to manage education or health services. Some @government officials# con-
sider that a period of operating under the Indian Act will be a valuable “capacity-
developing” experience for the Innu. Under this view, self-government is
postponed even further into the future, perhaps indefinitely.
Elsewhere, Backhouse and McRae mention that some government offi-
cials believe that a land claim will cause more problems than they will
solve. Other officials question the ability and capacity of the Innu to take
on the responsibilities of land management under a CLC agreement ~Back-
house and McRae, 2002: 42!.
Another government perception variable that seems to matter is accul-
turation. In the context of CLC negotiations, the term refers to the level
at which a group is familiar with Western institutions, processes, ideas,
culture and languages. The government’s perception of a group’s level of
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acculturation may be a factor in the willingness of government to nego-
tiate towards a settlement. Paul Nadasdy ~2003: 5! argues:
If Aboriginal peoples wish to participate in co-management, land claims nego-
tiations, and other processes that go along with this new relationship, then they
must engage in dialogue with wildlife biologists, lawyers, and other govern-
ment officials. First Nations people can of course speak to these officials any
way they want, but if they wish to be taken seriously, then their linguistic utter-
ances must conform to the very particular forms and formalities of the official
linguistic fields of wildlife management, Canadian property law, and so forth.
Only through years of schooling or informal training can First Nations people
become fluent in the social and linguistic conventions of these official dis-
courses. Those who do not do so are effectively barred from participation in
these processes.
In general, the Inuit are much more acculturated to Canadian soci-
ety than the Innu, partly because they were influenced and settled by the
Moravian missionaries several hundred years ago. A good example of
Inuit acculturation is language. Most Inuit in Labrador have been edu-
cated in Western schools and now speak only English. According to 2001
Census data for the five main Inuit communities on the coast of Labra-
dor, English was the first learned and solely understood language among
81.1 per cent of the Inuit population, while 0.4 per cent spoke French
and 18.5 per cent spoke Inuktitut. Contrast this to the Innu: according to
2001 Census data, only 13.2 per cent of Innu members speak English
and 86.8 per cent speak Innuaimun, the Labrador Innu language. Accord-
ing to some government observers, the Innu face a real capacity prob-
lem, in which they have few leaders who can successfully navigate
Canadian institutions and negotiation processes. They also face a com-
munication problem, as Innu leaders have at times found it difficult to
explain the land claims process and land claims terminology such as
“quantum” to community members. Many land claims concepts do not
have an equivalent word in Innuaimun. Although the evidence is not as
conclusive about the effect of acculturation on negotiations, several inter-
viewees did mention that it seemed to play a role in the willingness of
governments to negotiate a settlement.
Quadrant 3: Internal Factors Affecting Speed
Tactical Timing
One internal factor that can affect the speed at which an outcome is
obtained is the decision on when to use confrontational tactics during
negotiations. Confrontational tactics, if used sparingly and in situations
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where an opportunity window emerges, can lead to accelerated negotia-
tions. When nickel was found in Voisey’s Bay, the Inuit, who had claimed
the area prior to the discovery, quickly made their consent to the project
contingent upon the settlement of their land claims. According to former
Deputy Minister of INAC Scott Serson ~2006!, “Some of my colleagues
in other departments were concerned that failure to open these mines
@Voisey’s Bay# in a timely manner would hurt Canada’s international
reputation and hurt future investment. I believe this helped spur on
Newfoundland and helped me with federal Central Agencies.” The LIA
recognized that Voisey’s Bay was an opportunity to speed up negotia-
tions because of the importance that both governments placed on the dis-
covery. When the province approved the mining company’s application
to build “exploration infrastructure” in the mid-1990s despite Inuit objec-
tions, the Inuit held protests and filed for a court injunction against the
province and the company. The message the Inuit gave to the parties was
that they would do whatever was necessary to stop the project unless
their land claim was completed ~LIA, 1998: 10!. By creating uncertainty
with threats to disrupt a major economic development project unless their
land claim was settled, the LIA created powerful incentives for the gov-
ernments to quickly negotiate a settlement ~Tony Andersen, 2006; Bar-
bour, 2006; Andersen III, 2006; Pain, 2006; Rowell, 2006!. The LIA was
able to take advantage of the Voisey’s Bay discovery to force govern-
ments to settle their claim before development could move forward.5
On the other hand, the Innu failed to link the Voisey’s Bay project to
the completion of their land claim. Although they too held protests and
filed for a court injunction to stop the Voisey’s Bay development, they
would eventually complete the Voisey’s Bay chapter of their AIP as well
as an impact benefits agreement ~IBA!, all before signing an AIP. Accord-
ing to Backhouse and McRae ~2002: 42!, some Innu were concerned that
completing side agreements on Voisey’s Bay would “cause the Govern-
ment to lose interest in completing the full land claims negotiations.” This
is exactly what happened. After the Voisey’s Bay chapter and the IBA were
signed, the federal and provincial governments shifted their focus from
land claim negotiations to addressing specific Innu domestic problems.
The Innu have realized that they missed an opportunity when they signed
the various Voisey’s Bay agreements before completing an AIP. Accord-
ing to Backhouse and McRae ~2002: 42!, “The Innu are @now# appar-
ently not prepared to conclude an agreement on Lower Churchill
@hydroelectric project# until land claims negotiations are completed.”
Trust Relationships
Another important factor affecting speed is the ability of First Nations
negotiators and officials to develop professional trust relationships with
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their federal and provincial counterparts. According to all of the negoti-
ators, the trust built between negotiators post-1996 was an important fac-
tor for completing the Inuit agreement ~Mackenzie, 2006; Serson, 2006;
Warren, 2006; Pain, 2006; Haysom, 2006!. Trust allowed the negotiators
to propose ideas to each other outside of the formal negotiating process,
without fear that these proposals would be used against them in future
formal negotiation sessions. There was also trust between Inuit leaders
and federal and provincial executives at critical junctures. The success of
the October 1997 meetings, for instance, was partly due to the strong
relationships between Scott Serson, deputy minister of INAC, Chesley
Andersen of the LIA and Harold Marshall from Newfoundland and Lab-
rador. Relationships between Innu negotiators and their counterparts, on
the other hand, have not been as productive. According to government
sources, some Innu negotiators have been confrontational and combat-
ive, with highly unreasonable expectations and demands.
Trust relationships affect speed as opposed to whether an outcome
is obtained. If the Inuit had not built trust relationships with the federal
and provincial governments, other factors would have resulted in a com-
pleted treaty. This is because government negotiators are subject to higher
political authorities, who, on the basis of congruent goals, the First
Nation’s choice of strategies, the First Nation’s internal cohesiveness, and
government perceptions, can direct their negotiators to complete a deal.
Or, they can decide to simply replace the government negotiators. There-
fore, trust relationships do not determine whether an outcome is obtained;
rather, they affect the speed of negotiations.
Quadrant 4: External Factors Affecting Speed
Government and External Negotiators
Government negotiators matter in two specific ways. First, a non-
bureaucrat negotiator is important because he or she is not subject to the
same constraints imposed on a bureaucrat ~Warren, 2006; Rowell, 2006;
Pain, 2006; Haysom, 2006; Whittington, 2005!. In the fall of 1996, the
federal government appointed Jim Mackenzie, a non-bureaucrat, as chief
federal negotiator to sit beside the senior federal negotiator ~a bureau-
crat! at the Inuit table. Mackenzie was effective because he initially had
direct access to the minister of Indian Affairs and was not subject to the
bureaucratic hierarchy that bureaucratic negotiators face. Contrast this with
the previous bureaucrat negotiator. During her tenure, very little got done,
partly because she was trapped within the bureaucratic lines of authority.
She constantly had to clear negotiation items with her superiors, which
frequently delayed negotiations and annoyed aboriginal negotiators.
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The federal government did appoint an outsider as chief federal nego-
tiator for the Innu in the late 1990s. However, he has focused on other
issues, such as registration and reserve creation, policing, justice and heal-
ing services. So far, he has had little to do with the land claims negotia-
tions, meaning that the Innu continue to deal solely with bureaucrat
negotiators ~Innes, 2006!.
Second, the commitment and personality of the negotiator seems to
matter. Provincial and LIA interviewees agreed that the provincial nego-
tiator, Bob Warren, was extremely important in getting a deal done.
Although Warren was a provincial bureaucrat, it was clear he believed in
the LIA and was willing to “go the extra mile” within the provincial
bureaucracy. According to one anonymous observer, Warren was at one
point seen by his colleagues in the provincial bureaucracy as being more
committed to the Inuit than the province. Yet Warren had both the neces-
sary expertise and the respect within the provincial bureaucracy to work
effectively on behalf of Inuit concerns. This is not say that Warren was
not tough or mindful of provincial concerns at the negotiating table. How-
ever, it was clear that his commitment to the Inuit, and his expertise,
energy and the respect he commanded in the bureaucracy, were invalu-
able in moving Inuit negotiations forward.
These two factors affect speed as opposed to whether an outcome is
obtained, because government negotiators, whether they are bureaucrats
or third-party negotiators, are subject to higher political authorities; if
the deputy minister, minister, premier, or prime minister are not inter-
ested in a deal, then it does not matter if an external negotiator is present
or if a provincial negotiator is committed to a deal. Moreover, an agree-
ment could be reached without the presence of an external negotiator or
a provincial negotiator who believed in the aboriginal group. For instance,
the October 1997 Inuit meeting would have taken place and resolved the
critical issues delaying Inuit negotiations even if there was no third-
party negotiator or pro-Inuit provincial negotiator present.
Land Value and Location
The value of the actual land being claimed also affects the speed at which
an outcome is obtained. Compared to the Innu claim, the Inuit wanted
land that had less potential for economic development. Besides Voisey’s
Bay, Inuit negotiations revolved mainly around hunting, fishing, forestry
and control over some subsurface resources. Innu negotiations also
involved Voisey’s Bay, but also included a number of other multimillion-
dollar development projects, including iron ore, nickel, uranium, for-
estry and, most importantly, the massive hydroelectric energy projects in
Upper and Lower Churchill. So there was less at stake in the Inuit claim
in terms of economic development potential than in the Innu claim.
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The location of the land is also important. Michael Whittington,
Yukon chief federal negotiator from 1987 to 1993, observed that “the
more remote FNs @in the Yukon# settled earlier because their land selec-
tions were less constrained by competing uses” ~2005!. This dynamic was
also in play for the Labrador groups. The Inuit claim involved mostly
remote and homogenous regions in the province, where the Inuit were by
far the majority. As such, the provincial and federal governments had
fewer non-Inuit third parties to accommodate in the final agreement. The
Innu claim, on the other hand, involves land in central and southern Lab-
rador where they are the minority, meaning that the federal and provin-
cial governments are subject to substantial non-aboriginal public and
stakeholder pressure. Since the Innu are a minority and any agreement
will have an impact on the lives of the majority in the area, crafting a
deal that satisfies the non-aboriginal majority is important for both gov-
ernments ~Pelley, 2006; Warren, 2006!.
These factors affect speed rather than whether an outcome is ob-
tained, because in the presence of positive government perceptions,
good choice of tactics and congruent goals, negotiating parties can still
come to an agreement that overcomes land value complications and sat-
isfies the concerns of third-party interests. The fact that the Inuit com-
pleted their deal despite the discovery of Voisey Bay, a piece of land
that is both valuable and subject to significant third-party interests, is
compelling.
Conclusion
The findings of this paper are significant for drawing attention to the
important role that First Nations play in influencing CLC negotiation
outcomes. Previous literature has tended to focus on the federal and
provincial governments and the negotiation processes that they have cre-
ated, finding that such processes place First Nations at a distinct bargain-
ing disadvantage ~see RCAP, 1996; Penikett, 2006; de Costa, 2003!. As
such, students of CLC negotiations have tended to offer prescriptions cen-
tred on governmental reform; these include flexible mandates, increased
funding to First Nations, changes to negotiation policies and practices,
and the introduction of alternative forms of dialogue and knowledge,
among other things. This paper agrees with the previous literature that
the current institutional framework privileges the federal and provincial
governments over participating First Nations. However, in the absence of
large-scale institutional reform at the federal, provincial and territorial
levels, scholars and practitioners need to pay more attention to the role
of aboriginal agency in affecting CLC negotiation outcomes.
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Notes
1 These individuals were initially contacted by phone or e-mail, in which the purposes
of the study and informed consent were explained. They were then sent informed
consent forms. Before each interview began, the purpose of the study and informed
consent were again explained to each participant. At the end of each interview, each
participant was given the opportunity to change or delete anything said. They were
also given the opportunity to see my interview notes and could request that I send
them a copy of any material prior to submission to a journal or publication. Some
passages in this document are based on anonymous interview data provided by par-
ticipants listed in the bibliography, but also by participants who declined to be iden-
tified in the text or in the bibliography.
2 For details on the relationship between RCAP and Gathering Strength, see Abele,
1999: 450–453.
3 The Framework Agreement was also completed because the stakes involved were
much lower; a Framework Agreement merely sets out the process by which an
Agreement-in-Principle ~AIP! is to be negotiated. Indeed, most, if not all, groups
that enter into the CLC process are able to complete a Framework Agreement. In
contrast, an AIP is more difficult to negotiate because it involves substantive issues
like land and resource control.
4 Thanks to one anonymous reviewer for suggesting this table.
5 It should be noted here that the LIA did allow Voisey’s Bay to move forward before
their claim was completed. This was because they had already signed their AIP and
had received assurances from high-level federal and provincial executives that their
land claim would be completed as quickly as possible. This is related to the trust
relationships described later in the paper.
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